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Abstract
The theory of combinatorial games (like board games)
and the theory of social games (where one looks for
Nash equilibria) are normally considered two separate
theories. Here we shall see what comes out of com-
bining the ideas. J. Conway observed that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the real numbers
and a special type of combinatorial games. There-
fore the payoffs of a social games are combinatorial
games. Probability theory should be considered a
safety net that prevents inconsistent decisions via the
Dutch Book Argument. This result can be extended
to situations where the payoff function yields a more
general game than a real number. The main difference
between number-valued payoff and game-valued pay-
off is that the existence of a probability distribution
that gives non-negative mean payoff does not ensure
that the game will not be lost.
Keywords. Combinatorial game, Dutch Book The-
orem, exchangable sequences, game theory, surreal
number.
1 Introduction
The word game in mathematics has two different
meanings. The first type of games are the social
games where a number of agents at the same time
have to make a choice and where the payoff to each
agent is a function of all agents’ choices. Each agent
has his own payoff function. The question is how the
agents should choose in order to maximize their own
payoff. In general the players may benefit by mak-
ing coalitions against each other. This kind of game
theory has found important applications in social sci-
ences and economy. A special class of these social
games are the two-person zero-sum games where col-
laboration between the agents makes no sense.
The second type of games are the combinatorial
games. These are mathematical models of board
games. These games are the ones that people find
interesting and amusing. Games that people play for
amusement often involve an element of chance, gen-
erated by, for instance, dice, but the combinatorial
games are by definition the ones that do not contain
this element. Therefore they are sometimes called
games of no chance [15]. Examples from this cate-
gory are chess, nim, nine-mens-morris, and go. Com-
binatorial game theory has been particularly success-
ful in the analysis of impartial games like nim [5] and
has lead to a better understanding of endgames in
go [3, 4, 15].
The Dutch Book Theorem is important in our under-
standing of imprecise probabilities. The Dutch Book
Theorem was first formulated and proved by F. P.
Ramsay in 1926 (reprinted in [16]) and later indepen-
dently by B. de Finetti [8], who used it as an argument
for a subjective interpretation of probabilities. Since
the original formulation of the Dutch Book Theorem
most of the research has been in the direction of more
subjective versions. As it is normally formulated, the
theorem relies on the concept of a real-valued payoff
function. One may think of an outcome of the pay-
off function as money but the uniform mean of hav-
ing £ 1.000.000 and having £ 0 is having £ 500.000.
Most people have a very clear preference for having
£ 500.000 rather than an unknown amount of money
with mean £ 500.000. Instead one may think of the
payoff as a more subjective notion of value, but this is
also a highly debatable concept and one may actually
consider money as our best attempt to quantify value.
Savage showed that the concept of value and payoff
function can be replaced by the concept of preference,
so that a coherent set of preferences corresponds to
the existence of a payoff function and a probability
measure. This line of research has been followed up
by many other researchers [6, 17]. All those studies
involve some subjective notion of value or preference.
In order to better understand the Dutch Book Theo-
rem it is desirable to see how the theory would look
in an environment where a subjective notion of value
plays no role. In this study we replace the normal
payoff functions by game-valued functions. There are
several reasons why this is of interest:
• A real-valued payoff function is a special case of
a game-valued payoff function.
• The theory of probability has its origin in the
study of games involving chance.
• Social game theory and combinatorial game the-
ory may mutually benefit from a closer interac-
tion.
• One can often get insight into a special case by
the study of its generalizations.
With a game-valued payoff function the players in
a social game have to play a certain combinatorial
game that depends on their decisions and/or on some
random event. This setup may seem quite contrived,
but many board games that involve chance are of this
form.
Example 1 In chess it is normally considered a
slight advantage to play white. Therefore one nor-
mally randomly selects who should play white and who
should play black.
Example 2 M. Ettinger has developed an interesting
version of combinatorial game theory where after each
move a coin is flipped to determine who is going to
play next [9].
Actually any board game involving chance may be
considered as an example. It will be the subject
of a future paper how to take advantage of a com-
bined probabilistic and combinatorial game approach
for some specific board games. In this short note we
shall focus entirely on how we should formulate or re-
formulate the Dutch Book Theorem when the payoffs
are combinatorial games.
Social games and combinatorial games are built on
quite different ideas and many scientists only know
one of the types of game theory. There have only
been few attempts to combine the two types of game
theory [9, 22]. In this exposition we will assume that
the reader has basic knowledge about social games
such as two-person zero-sum games. Nevertheless we
have to repeat some of the elementary definitions from
social game theory in order to fix notation and, in
particular, to avoid confusion with similar but slightly
different concepts from combinatorial game theory.
Our main result is that it is possible to formulate ver-
sions of the Dutch Book Theorem for game-valued
payoff functions, but there will be some important
modifications of the theorem. For instance our prob-
ability distributions will not always be real-valued. In
our approach the focus is on order structure (induced
by games) and its relation to decision theory. A some-
what orthogonal approach was taken in [13] where the
probabilities were elements of a metric space with no
order structure.
2 Combinatorial games
The theory of combinatorial games was developed by
J. Conway as a tool to analyze board games [5, 7].
A short and more careful exposition can be found
in [18]. In a board game the players alternate in mak-
ing moves. Each move changes the configuration of
the pieces on the board to some other configuration
but only certain changes are allowed. It is convenient
to call the two players Left and Right. We shall of-
ten consider different board configurations as different
games. If G denotes a game, i.e. a certain configura-
tion then the game is specified by the configurations
GL that Left is allow to move to and the configura-
tions GR that Right is allowed to move to, and we
write G =
{
GL | GR
}
. Note that we have not told
who is playing first, and therefore we have to describe
it from both Left’s and Right’s perspective. Now the
point is that GL and GR are sets of games, so a game
is formally a specification of two sets of games. In a
board game it is nice to have many options to choose
among and bad if there are only few options. The
worst case for Left is if there are no options left and
in this case we say that Left has lost the game. So
Left has lost the game if he is to move next and GL
is empty. Similar Right loses the game if it is Right
to move and GR is empty. The rules of many board
games can be modelled in this way.
Example 3 (Games illustrated in Figure 1.)
The game {∅ | ∅} is a boring one. The one to move
first loses this game. This game is denoted 0.
0 -1 1 *
Figure 1: Games can be illustrated by game trees.
Options for Left are illustrated by left slanting edges,
and options for Right are illustrated by right slanting
edges. Here are the simplest ones. In more complicted
games there may be several left or right slanting edges
from each node.
The game {∅ | 0} is lost by Left if Left has to move
first. If Right goes first Right has to choose 0. Now it
is Left to move but this is a losing position for the one
who is going to move, so poor Left loses. Thus Right
always wins the game {∅ | 0} . This game is denoted
−1.
The game {0 | ∅} is lost by Right if Right has to move
first. If Left goes first Left has to choose 0. Now it
is Right to move but this is a losing position for the
one who is going to move, so now Left is happy again
because he wins. Thus Left always wins the game
{0 | ∅} . This game is denoted 1.
Similarly we see that {0 | 0} is won by the player that
moves first. This game is called star and is denoted ∗.
In Japanese go terminology such a position is called
dame.
Here we shall use the following recursive definition of
a game.
Definition 1 A game is a pair
{
GL | GR
}
where GL
and GR are sets of already defined games.
The status of a game G can be classified according to
who wins if both players play optimally. We define
G = 0, if second player wins;
G < 0, if Right wins whoever plays first;
G > 0, if Left wins whoever plays first;
G ‖ 0, if first player wins.
For a gameG we can reverse the role of Left and Right
and call this the negative of the game. Formally we
use the following recursive definition.
Left and Right can play two games in parallel. In
every round each player should make a move in one
of the games of his own choice. Perhaps there are
urgent moves to be made in both games so the players
have to prioritize in which game it is most important
to make the move. Several games played in parallel
is called the sum of the games, and many positions
in actual board games can be understood as sums of
−G G
Figure 2: The game tree of −G is simply the mirror
image of the game tree of G.
sub-games. Combinatorial game theory is essentially
the theory of how to prioritize your moves in a board
game that has the structure of a sum of independent
sub-games. Formally the sum of the games G and H
is defined recursively by
G+H ={(
GL +H
)
∪
(
G+HL
)
|
(
GR +H
)
∪
(
G+HR
)}
.
The sum of games is normally illustrated by the dis-
joint union of the game trees of the individual games.
The game G−H is by definition the game G+(−H) .
Now, we are able to define what it should mean that
two games are equal. We write G = H if G−H = 0,
i.e. second player wins G−H. One can define G > H ,
G < H, and G ‖ H in the same way. We say that G
and H are confused if G ‖ H. One can prove that
G = H if and only if G+K and H+K have the same
status for any game K.
With these operations the class of games has the
structure as a partially ordered Abelian group. Any
Abelian group is a module over the ring of integers
with multiplication defined as follows. If n is a natu-
ral number we define n ·G by
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
G+G+ · · ·+G .
If n = 0 then 0 · G is by definition equal to 0. If n
is a negative integer we define n · G to be equal to
(−n) · (−G) .
The equation 2 · G = 0 has G = 0 as solution, but
G = ∗ is also a solution. Therefore there is in general
no unique way of defining multiplication of a game
by 1/2, and the same holds for other non-integers.
From this point of view it is surprising that all dyadic
fractions (rational numbers of the form n/2m) can be
identified with games. One way of doing it goes as
follows.
3 Numbers may be identified with
games
J. Conway discovered that all real numbers can be
identified with games but his construction will lead to
a larger class of numbers called the surreal numbers
(or Conway numbers). The surreal numbers were first
described in a mathematical novel by D. Knuth [14],
and later in much detail by J. Conway [7]. For newer
and more complete descriptions we refer to [1, 11].
We have already defined the game 1 so the integer
n is identified with the game n · 1. The game {0 | 1}
satisfies
2 · {0 | 1} = 1.
1 2−1 2−2 2−3
Figure 3: Some dyadic fractions.
Hence the 2−1 can be identified with the game {0 | 1} .
In general the game {0 | 2−m} satisfies
2 ·
{
0 | 2−m
}
= 2−m
so the fraction 2−(m+1) can be identified with the
game
Thus the fraction n/2m can be identified with the
game n · 2−m. In this way any dyadic fraction can be
identified with a game.
A real number can be identified with a Dedekind sec-
tion in the group of dyadic fractions. In other words,
a real number r, can be identified with the partition
of the dyadic fractions into the sets
A = {n · 1/2m < r | m,n ∈ N} ,
B = {n · 1/2m > r | m,n ∈ N} .
Now, A and B can be identified with sets of games and
therefore {A | B} is a game. When r is a real number
that is not a dyadic fraction, it can be identified with
the game {A | B} . At this step one has to check that
the structure of the real numbers as an ordered group
is preserved under the embedding but this turn out
to be the case [7].
We have seen that real numbers may be identified with
games, but combining the definition of a game with
the idea of a Dedekind section leads to the much larger
class of numbers called the surreal numbers. Formally
a surreal number is a game of the form {A | B} where
A andB are sets of (already constructed) surreal num-
bers such that a < b for a ∈ A and b ∈ B. That means
that a surreal number can always be played as a com-
binatorial game.
Example 4 The first transfinite ordinal number ω
is identified with the game {N | ∅} . The equation
ω − ω = 0 makes no sense in Cantor’s arithmetic
for transfinite ordinals or cardinals, but if we identify
ω with a game the equation makes sense, because we
have
ω − ω = {1, 2, 3, · · · | ∅}+ {∅ | −1,−2,−3, · · · } .
This game is essentially like ”my father has more
money than your father” and most children soon ex-
perience that one should not start in such a game. It
is clear that ω should not be interpreted as an amount
but is better understood as a huge set of options. Con-
way identified all Cantor’s ordinal numbers with sur-
real numbers, but Cantor and Conway use different
additive structures so the identification is somewhat
problematic. For instance Conway’s addition is com-
mutative but Cantor’s addition of ordinal numbers is
not. Here we shall use ω as a symbol for a game rather
than an ordinal in Cantor’s sense.
Formally the surreal numbers are constructed by
(transfinite) recursion. It starts with the number
0 = {∅ | ∅} . In each recursion step one adds new
surreal numbers to the ones already constructed. Ad-
dition and multiplication extend to surreal numbers
and with these operations the surreal numbers are a
maximal ordered field. Although the definition of sur-
real multiplication is relevant for the next two sections
we cannot present the definition in this short note but
have to refer to [7,18]. For most computations surreal
numbers are not different from real numbers but the
topology is different.
A game G is said to be infinitesimal if −2−m ≤ G ≤
2−m for all natural numbers m. The number 1/ω is
an example of an infinitesimal number that is posi-
tive. Between any two different real numbers there
are more than continuously many surreal numbers,
and the intersection of the intervals [−2−m; 2−m] con-
tains infinitely many infinitesimal numbers. Formally
there are so many surreal numbers that they do not
form a set but a class.
4 Surreal probabilities and payoffs
Here we will introduce a version of the Dutch Book
Theorem for surreal payoff functions. Because of the
somewhat different topology of the surreal numbers,
we have to be a little careful in the formulation and
proof of the Dutch Book Theorem. In particular some
of the standard methods for proving these results like
the Hahn-Banach theorem and the separation theo-
rem for convex sets, do not hold in their normal for-
mulation when we are using surreal numbers. Those
used to to non-standard analysis may note that what
we are doing is essentially to veify that our result may
be formulated in first order language.
The setup is as follows. Alice wishes to make a bet on
an outcome a ∈ A. A bookmaker b ∈ B offers the sur-
real payoff g (a, b) (positive or negative) if the outcome
of a random event is a ∈ A. Thus (a, b)→ g (a, b) can
be considered as a matrix when A and B are finite
sets. Alice should reject to play with a bookmaker b if
Alice thinks that the payoff function a→ g (a, b) is not
favorable. For simplicity we shall assume that Alice
accepts the payoff functions offered by the bookmak-
ers b ∈ B.We recall that a surreal number is a game so
if the outcome is a and the bookmaker is b then Alice
has to play the game g (a, b) against the bookmaker
with Alice playing Left and the bookmaker playing
Right.
By a portfolio we shall mean a probability vector Q =
(qb)b∈B on B. In this section will allow the portfolio
to have surreal values. Such a portfolio is described
by the payoff function
a→
∑
b∈B
qb · g (a, b) , (1)
A Dutch book is a portfolio such that (1) is negative
for all a ∈ A, i.e. the portfolio game will be lost by
Alice for any value of a ∈ A.
We assume that one of the bookmakers b0 offers a
payoff function g (a, b0) = 0 for all a ∈ A (b0 acts like
a bank with interest rate 0). Let Q be a portfolio and
assume that there exists a Dutch book Q′. If Q has B
as support then qmin = minb∈B qb > 0 and the payoff
is ∑
b∈B
qb · g (·, b) =
∑
b∈B
(qb − qmin · q
′
b) · g (·, b) + qminqb
∑
b∈B
q′b · g (·, b) <
∑
b∈B
(qb − qmin · q
′
b) ·g (·, b)+
(
qmin
∑
b∈B
q′b
)
·g (·, b0) .
Hence Alice should reject to play with at least one of
the bookmakers. If no Dutch book exists the set of
payoff functions is said to be coherent. The notion of
convexity will be used, and in this section we allow
surreal coefficients in convex combinations.
Theorem 1 Let A and B denote finite sets and let
(a, b) → g (a, b) denote a surreal valued payoff func-
tion. If the payoff function is coherent then there ex-
ists non-negative surreal numbers pa such that
∑
pa =
1 and ∑
a∈A
pa · g (a, b) ≥ 0 (2)
for all b ∈ B.
Proof. Assume that A has d elements. Then
each function g (·, b) may be identified with a d-
dimensional surreal vector. Let K be the convex hull
of {g (·, b) | b ∈ B} , and let L denote the strictly neg-
ative surreal functions on A. They are convex classes.
If K and L intersect then there exists non-negative
surreal numbers qb such that
∑
qb = 1 and such that
(1) defines a strictly negative function.
Assume that K and L are disjoint. Then define C =
K −L as the class of vectors x¯− y¯ where x¯ in K and
y¯ in L. This is convex and does not contain 0¯. Now,
K is a polytope (convex hull of finitely many extreme
points) and L is polyhedral (given by finitely many
inequalities), so C is polyhedral. Hence, each of the
faces of C is given by a linear inequality of the form∑
a∈A pa · g (a) ≥ c for g ∈ C. The delta function δα
is non-negative so if g is in C then g − ℓ · δα is also in
C for ℓ positive. In particular
c ≤
∑
a∈A
pa · (g − ℓ · δα) (a)
=
∑
a∈A
pa · g (a)−
∑
a∈A
paℓδα (a)
=
∑
a∈A
pa · g (a)− ℓ · pα
for all positive ℓ. Hence pα ≥ 0 for all α ∈ A. Further
we know that 0¯ is not in C so that
∑
a∈A pa · 0 ≥ c
does not hold and therefore c > 0. In particular pa
cannot be 0 for all a. The result follows by replacing
pa by
pa∑
a∈A pa
.
Note that our surreal valued version Dutch Book The-
orem states there are two exclusive cases:
1. Dutch book.
2. Non-negative mean value.
The theorem leads to surreal probabilities pa ≥ 0.
Due to the normalization we do not have infinite prob-
abilities, but there is no problem in having infinitesi-
mal probabilities. In general the probability distribu-
tion will not be uniquely determined, but will merely
be located in a non-empty convex set (credal set).
Therefore the Dutch Book Theorem suggests that un-
certainty about some unknown event should be rep-
resented by a convex set of surreal probability distri-
butions rather than a single real valued distribution.
Real functions are special cases of surreal functions
so even if the payoff functions are real valued one can
model our uncertainty by a convex set of surreal prob-
ability distributions.
If either g is acceptable or −g is acceptable then it is
called a two-sided bet. In this case the convex set of
probability distributions reduces to a point. The term
one-sided bet is taken from F. Hampel [12]. In general
people will find it difficult to decide that either g or
−g is acceptable and thus the two-sided bet is not
realistic. In De Finetti [8] only two-sided bets were
considered. In our formulation of the Dutch Book
Theorem we just have a one-sided bet with a set of
acceptable payoff functions.
A special case that has been studied in great detail is
when the functions g (·, b) only assume two different
values, i.e. g (·, b) has the form
g (a, b) =
{
g1 (b) , for a ∈ Ab;
g2 (b) , for a /∈ Ab.
Without loss of generality we may assume that
g1 (b) ≥ 0 > g2 (b) . Then the g is accepted when
P (Ab) g1 (b) + (1− P (Ab)) g2 (b) ≥ 0 or equivalently
P (Ab) ≥
−g2 (b)
g1 (b)− g2 (b)
. (3)
We then define the lower provision function [21] by
L (A) = minP (A)
where the minimum is taken over all distributions P
that satisfies (3) for all b ∈ B. One may form surreal
lower provisions in the same way as ordinary lower
provisions are formed.
In this section we have seen that uncertainty may be
identified with a convex set of surreal-valued proba-
bility distribution, but often such convex sets contain
a lot of real-valued distributions. One may therefore
ask whether the surreal-valued distributions add any-
thing to the theory. Are they of any use? This we
will try to answer in the next section.
5 Two-person zero-sum games
The theory of two persons zero sum games was
founded by J. von Neumann together with O. Mor-
genstern [20] and has been extended to social games
with more players. The readers who are interested in
a deeper understanding of the theory of social games
should consult [19] for an easy introduction or [10] for
a more detailed exposition.
A social game with 2 players, that we will call Al-
ice and Bob, is described by 2 sets of strategies A,B
such that Alice can choose a strategy from A and Bob
can choose a strategy from B. If Alice choose a and
Bob choose b then the payoff for Alice will be g (a, b)
and the payoff for Bob will be −g (a, b) , where g is
a function from A×B to surreal numbers. Alice and
Bob will never collaborate in a zero-sum game because
what is good for one of the players is equally bad for
the other.
A pair of strategies (a, b) is called a Nash equilibrium
if no player will benefit by changing his own strategy
if the other player leaves his strategy unchanged. If
a game has a unique Nash pair and both players are
rational, then both players should play according to
the Nash equilibrium.
Assume that the players are allowed to use mixed
strategies, i.e. choose independent probability dis-
tributions over the strategies. The probabilities are
allowed to take surreal values. Let P be the mixed
strategy of Alice and Q be a mixed strategy of Bob.
Then the mean payoff for Alice is
g (P,Q) =
∑
(a,b)
g (a, b) · paqb.
This number is considered as the payoff of the social
game where mixed strategies are allowed.
Theorem 2 Consider a game with surreal valued
payoffs. If the players are allowed to use mixed strate-
gies, then the game has a Nash equilibrium.
There exists various different proofs of the existence of
Nash equilibria for two-person zero-sum games [2,10,
19, 20]. In this note we shall focus on its equivalence
with the Dutch Book Theorem.
The minimax inequality
max
a∈A
min
b∈B
g (a, b) ≤ min
b∈B
max
a∈A
g (a, b)
is proved in exactly the same way for surreal payoff
functions as for real payoff functions. The game is
said to be in equilibrium when these quantities are
equal. The common value is the value of the game.
For any mixed strategy P for Alice the minimum of
g (P,Q) over distributions Q is attained when Q is
concentrated in a point, i.e. Q = δb for some pure
strategy b ∈ B. Thus
min
Q
g (P,Q) = min
b
∑
a
g (a, b) · pa. (4)
To maximize this over all surreal-valued distributions
P is a linear programming problem and can be solved
by the same methods as if the payoff functions were
real valued. In particular there exists a surreal valued
distribution that maximizes (4). Using this argument
we see that minimax and maximin are obtained even
for mixed strategies.
Proof of equivalence of Thm. 1 and Thm. 2.
Assume that for a two person zero-sum game there
exists a value λ with optimal strategies P andQ. Then
λ < 0 leads to the existence of a Dutch book and λ ≥ 0
leads to the existence of a distribution P satisfying
(2).
g a1 a2
b1 1 + 1/ω −1− 2/ω
b2 −1 1 + 1/ω
Table 1: Payoff for Alice.
Assume that the Dutch Book Theorem holds. Assume
that there exist a surreal number λ such that
max
P
min
Q
g (P,Q) < λ < min
Q
max
P
g (P,Q)
Consider the payoff function f (a, b) = g (a, b) − λ.
According to the Dutch Book Theorem there exists a
probability distribution P on A∑
a∈A
pa · f (a, b) ≥ 0
for all b ∈ B; or there exists a probability distribution
Q on B such that∑
b∈B
qb · f (a, b) < 0
for all a ∈ A. Therefore there exists a probability
distribution P on A such that∑
a∈A
pa · g (a, b) ≤ λ (5)
for all a ∈ A or there exists a probability distribution
Q on B such that∑
b∈B
qb · g (a, b) ≥ λ (6)
for all strategies a ∈ A. Inequality (5) contradicts
that λ < minQmaxP g (P,Q) and Inequality (6)
contradicts that maxP minQ g (P,Q) < λ. Hence,
maxP minQ g (P,Q) = minQmaxP g (P,Q) .
The importance of the proof that the Dutch Book
Theorem is equivalent to the existence of a Nash
equilibrium for two-person zero-sum games is that it
means that the two results refer to the same type of
rationality. The next example show that the use of
using surreal probabilities may make the difference
between winning and losing.
Example 5 Consider the payoff function in Table 1.
If Alice ignores infinitesimals her optimal strategy is
the distribution (1/2, 1/2) , which gives a payoff func-
tion for Bob that is −1/2ω if b = b1 and 1/2ω if
b = b2. In this case Bob could win the game by choos-
ing b = b1. The minimax optimal strategy for Alice
is the mixed strategy
(
1/2 + 14(ω+1) , 1/2−
1
4(ω+1)
)
. If
she choose this mixed strategy the payoff is always pos-
itive and she will win the game.
g a1 a2
b1 ω + 1 −ω − 2
b2 −ω ω + 1
Table 2: Payoff for Alice multiplied by ω.
One should note that playing this game is not very dif-
ferent from playing the game where we have scaled the
payoff up by a factor ω (see Table 2). We may also
scale up Bob’s optimal strategy by a factor 4 (ω + 1) to
obtain (2ω + 3, 2ω + 1) . Therefore an optimal strategy
for Alice is to play the game 4 (ω + 1) ”times” in par-
allel in such a way that a1 is ”chosen 2ω + 3 times”
and a2 is ”chosen 2ω + 1 times ”.
If a two-persons zero-sum game has a Nash equi-
librium pair
(
a˜, b˜
)
, which is always the case if A
and B are finite, then supa∈A g
(
a, b˜
)
= g
(
a˜, b˜
)
and
therefore infb∈B supa∈A g (a, b) ≤ g
(
a˜, b˜
)
. Similarly,
supa∈A infb∈B g (a, b) ≥ g
(
a˜, b˜
)
. Thus, the game is
in equilibrium and the value of the game is g
(
a˜, b˜
)
.
In particular all Nash equilibria have the same value.
The same argument holds for mixed strategies.
6 Dutch books for short games
Surreal numbers are totally ordered and never con-
fused with each other. Games that are not surreal
number are confused with a small or large interval of
surreal numbers. For instance ∗ is confused with 0 and
the game {100 | −100} is confused with any number
between −100 and 100. Before formulating a Dutch
Book Theorem for general combinatorial games we
need to introduce the mean value µ (G) of a short
game G. A game G is said to be short if it only
has finitely many positions. Our recursive definition
of games allows transfinite recursion and games that
are not short, but for the definition of mean values we
shall focus on the short games. Note that if a short
game is a number then it is a dyadic fraction.
The mean value of a game G is a real number µ (G)
that satisfies the following mean value theorem.
Theorem 3 ( [7]) If G is a short game then there
exists a natural number m and a number µ (G) that
satisfies
n · µ (G)−m ≤ n ·G ≤ n · µ (G) +m
for all natural numbers n.
Mean values of short games can be calculated by the
thermographic method described in [7] and using this
method it is easy to see that the mean value of a
short game is always a rational number. Mean values
of games share some important properties with mean
values of random variables. For instance we have
• µ (n ·G) = n · µ (G) ,
• µ (G+H) = µ (G) + µ (H) ,
• G ≥ 0⇒ µ (G) ≥ 0,
• µ (1) = 1.
Example 6 The game G = {1 | {0 | −2}} that is il-
lustrated in Figure 2, satisfies G > 0. In the game n·G
Right can only play in a sub-game where Left has not
played and the response optimal for Left is always to
answer a move of Right by a move in the same sub-
game. From this one sees that n ·G ≤ 1 and therefore
that µ (G) = 0. We see that Left may win a game for
sure although the game has mean value zero!
The setup is as before that each bookmaker b ∈ B
tells Alice which game he wants to play if a certain
horse a ∈ A wins. Alice is going to play Left and
the bookmaker or the bookmakers are going to play
Right. After certain bookmakers have been accepted
the bookmakers choose natural numbers nb, b ∈ B and
combine these into a super game
∑
b∈B nb · G (a, b)
that will depend on which horse wins. We say that
we have a Dutch book if there exists natural numbers
n1, n2, · · · , nk such that Alice will lose the game∑
b∈B
nb ·G (a, b) (7)
for any value of a. Otherwise the set of game valued
payoff functions is said to be coherent. If all the games
are short surreal numbers then this notion of coher-
ence is equivalent to the definition of coherence given
in Section 4.
Alice is allowed to choose that the game should be
played a number of times in parallel. With this setup
we get the following version of the Dutch Book The-
orem.
Theorem 4 If a payoff function G (a, b) , a ∈ A, b ∈
B with short games as values, is coherent then either
exists a probability vector a→ pa and a natural num-
ber n such that npa ∈ N and the game∑
a
(npa) ·G (a, b) > 0, for all b ∈ B, (8)
or there exist natural numbers n1, n2, · · · , nk, a nat-
ural number n and a probability vector a → pa such
that both games (7) and (8) have mean value 0.
Proof. We apply the existence of an equilibrium in
the two-person zero-sum game with payoff function
(a, b) → µ (G (a, b)) . If the value of the two-person
zero-sum game is negative then the game (7) is nega-
tive if the coefficients n1, n2, · · · , nk are large enough.
If the value of the two-person zero-sum game is non-
negative there exists a probability vector a→ pa such
that ∑
a
pa · µ (G (a, b)) ≥ 0.
The mean value of a short game is a rational number.
Therefore the probability vector a→ pa can be chosen
with rational point probabilities. Hence, there exists
a natural number m such that m · pa is an integer for
all a ∈ A. Therefore
0 ≤ m
∑
a
pa · µ (G (a, b))
≤
∑
a
mpa · µ (G (a, b))
= µ
(∑
a
mpa ·G (a, b)
)
.
If
µ
(∑
a
mpa ·G (a, b)
)
> 0
then there exists a natural number k such that
k
∑
a
mpa ·G (a, b) > 0
and the game defined in (8) is winning for Alice who
plays as Left when n = km. Otherwise
µ
(∑
a
mpa ·G (a, b)
)
= 0. (9)
Here we should note that our short-game-valued
Dutch Book Theorem stated there are three cases that
are not exclusive:
1. Dutch book.
2. Positive mean.
3. Zero mean.
As we saw in Example 6 a game with mean zero may
be positive or negative. Therefore a decision strategy
in which only games with positive means are accept-
able will exclude some games that one will win for
sure and a decision strategy where games with non-
negative mean are acceptable will include some games
that are lost for sure. The most reasonable solution to
this problem seems to be to accept or reject accord-
ing to the mean payoff with respect to some probabil-
ity distribution, but leave the cases with mean zero
undecided because a more detailed non-probabilistic
analysis is needed for these cases.
7 More on infinitesimals
The Dutch Book Theorem for short games only used
rational valued mean values. One may hope for a
better Dutch Book Theorem if we allow also allow a
mean value function with infinitesimal surreal num-
bers as mean values. For short games this will not
solve the problem.
Definition 2 A game G is said to be strongly in-
finitesimal if −s ≤ G ≤ s for any surreal number
s > 0.
Example 7 The game {0 | ∗} is called up and de-
noted ↑. It is easy to check that ↑ > 0. The game ↑ is
infinitesimal (check how Left can win 2−s − ↑). One
can prove that any infinitesimal short game is strongly
infinitesimal [18].
An interesting situation is when all games G (a, b) are
infinitesimal. In this case the Dutch Book Theorem
for games as formulated in Theorem 4 tells exactly
nothing because the mean value of strongly infinites-
imal games would always be 0 even if surreal mean
values are allowed. But if all games are infinitesimal
one could shift to a different ”mean value” concept.
For short games one compares the game with n · 1
and the game 1 can be considered as a unit in the
theory. For infinitesimal short games one can com-
pare with the infinitesimal game ↑ instead. It is pos-
sible to define an atomic mean value such that ↑ has
mean 1, but the proofs are more involved. One can
also prove a version of the Dutch Book Theorem for
infinitesimally short games that involves three cases.
The three cases are Dutch book, positive mean, and
some games G that cannot be analyzed in the sense
that their atomic mean value is zero. Although in-
finitesimal games can be treated with their own mean
value concept this will not solve all problems because
games that are not infinitesimal may sometimes be
combined into strongly infinitesimal games. A simple
example consist of the games 1 and ↑ − 1 whose sum
is the strongly infinitesimal game ↑.
8 Discussion
In any frequency interpretation of probability theory,
probabilities should be interpreted as limits of fre-
quencies. Obviously surreal probabilities cannot have
such interpretations because a frequency interpreta-
tion cannot distinguish between surreal probabilities
that have an infinitesimal difference. This leads us
to the following conclusion: frequency probabilities
are real numbers but uncertainty should in general be
modelled by convex sets of surreal numbers.
In a subjective Bayesian approach to probability and
statistics one will assign probabilities expressing the
individual feeling of how probable or likely an event
is. Many subjective Bayesians justify this point of
view by reference to the Dutch Book Theorem. We
note that unlike some of the modification by Savage et
al. neither our formulation of the Dutch Book The-
orem nor its original formulation of de Finetti has
any reference to subjectivity. For short-game valued
payoffs even the one-to-one correspondence between
probability and coherent decisions breaks down. Ex-
periments have demonstrated that most people have a
bad intuition of probabilities and are unable to assign
probabilities in a consistent manner. It should be even
harder to make a consistent distinction between the
probabilities 1/3 and 1/3 + 1/ω although the Dutch
Book Theorem give the same type of justification for
surreal probabilities as for real probabilities.
We have seen that from a mathematical point of view
uncertainties may be modeled by a convex set of sur-
real probability vectors, but the reader may wonder
why infinitesimals do normally not appear in prob-
ability theory. Actually there are many real num-
bers that never appear as probabilities. For instance
all the numbers that do appear are computable, and
there are only countably many computable numbers.
Therefore, it seems that the use of surreal numbers is
an idealization that is not worse than the use of real
numbers as subjective probabilities. At the moment
two-person zero-sum games like the ones described in
Example 5 are the only known kind of calculations
that gives surreal valued probabilities as results.
In this paper we used the operations + and · to define
Dutch books and coherence. These operations refer
to ways of combining games into new games. It is
an open question what kind of Dutch Book Theorem
one would get if other ways of combining games were
considered.
For social games with several players and surreal-
valued payoff functions we have not been able to prove
existence of a Nash equilibrium, because one cannot
use the usual fixed-point results that rely heavily on
the topology of the real numbers. We shall not discuss
it here as it has less interest for our understanding of
what probabilities are.
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